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I. INTRODUCTION
As part of the 1983 trust law revision,' the Missouri General Assembly
enacted a provision prohibiting the blind exercise of a testamentary power
of appointment. 2 Prior to the enactment, Missouri was in the minority of
jurisdictions which looked to case law to determine whether a power of
appointment had been exercised.3 The legislature may have eliminated some
of the problems inherent in Missouri's prior law,4 but the present situation
opens ground for the development of two differing sets of rules for testa-
mentary powers of appointment.5
Powers of appointment are estate planning devices which are generally
recognized as most important for flexibility in the disposition of family set-
1. 1983 Mo. Laws 785 (currently enacted Mo. REv. STAT. § 456.235 (Supp.
1986)). For analysis of another 1983 trust-related revision, see Wiedenbeck, Missouri's
Repeal of the Calflin Doctrine-New View of the Policy Against Perpetuities? 50
Mo. L. REv. 805 (1985) (discussing Mo. REv. STAT. § 456.590.2 (Supp. 1986)).
2. Mo. REV. STAT. § 456.235 (Supp. 1986). For the text of the statute, see
infra text accompanying note 128.
3. See infra notes 130-36; see also French, Exercise of Powers of Appoint-
ment: Should Intent to Exercise Be Inferred from a General Disposition of Property?,
1979 DuKE L.J. 747, 753-54.
4. See infra notes 82-88, 165, and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 157-68 and accompanying text.
6. A power of appointment may be general or special. A general power may
be exercised in favor of the donee or the donee's estate. A special power may only
be exercised in favor of a designated group. In either case, the permissible appointees
are called objects of the power. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY §§ 318-320 (1940) [here-
inafter RESTATEMENT].
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tlements.7 The donor of property delays the designation of transferees of
that property by vesting in a donee8 the power to appoint those transferees
at a time post-dating the gift of property.9 Powers of appointment may be
classified into two broad groups, testamentary powers and nontestamentary
powers.' 0 Testamentary powers may only be exercised in a will." Similarly,
a nontestamentary power may only be exercised in a deed.' However, a
donor may grant a power which is exercisable in either a will or deed. 3 At
common law, the donee must manifest an intent to exercise the power in a
manner designated by the donor. 4 Problems arise when a court must deter-
mine whether there is a sufficient manifestation of intent to exercise the
donee's disposition. 5 While many solutions have been proposed and insti-
tuted, their effects are often confusing and, as in Missouri's case, often do
not simplify the problem. This Comment will outline both the common law
and statutory responses to the determination of intent to exercise and analyze
the relevant issues concerning Missouri's statute and the differing sets of
rules for powers of appointment.
7. L. SmEms & A. SMrrH, THm LAW op FuTuRE INTESmTs 861 (2d ed. 1956);
see, e.g., A. CASNER, ESTATE PLANN G 689-782 (3d ed. 1961); J. TRAcIrMAN, ESTATE
PLANN Na 201-11 (1968).
8. The donor may retain the power or grant it to another, as well as name
a taker or takers in default to receive the property in the event the donee fails to
exercise the power. RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, §§ 318-320.
9. L. Sims & A. SMrrH, supra note 7, § 861. The power of appointment
may be employed to ensure an intelligent disposition of property. An elderly testator,
A, may devise his property in trust to T, with instructions to pay the income to A's
son S for life, and may give S the special power to appoint among S's now-infant
children. A could just as easily have designated his grandchildren as the beneficiaries
of the trust. But in leaving the decision to his son, the special needs and abilities of
the grandchildren may be considered when they mature and such traits become evi-
dent. Id.
10. RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 321 (referring to nontestamentary powers
as powers presently exercisable).
11. L. Snoes & A. SMrrH, supra note 7, § 874. A donor may limit a general
power (see supra note 6) by giving the donee a general testamentary power. Thus,
the donee could only appoint his estate, and not himself, as the object of the power.
L. Snims & A. SMrrH, supra note 7, § 874.
12. L. SrmEs & A. SMrrH, supra note 7, § 874. Professors Lewis M. Simes
and Allan F. Smith note that nontestamentary powers may be further subdivided into
powers presently exercisable and powers limited to future exercise, such as those
conditioned on a future occurrence. Id. This Comment deals only with the broad
classifications of testamentary and nontestamentary as used by the American Law
Institute. RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 321.
13. L. Smms & A. ShnmI, supra note 7, § 874.
14. Id. §§ 972-973; Standley v. Allen, 349 Mo. 1115, 163 S.W.2d 1012 (1942);
Seltzer v. Schroeder, 409 S.W.2d 777 (Mo. Ct. App. 1966).
15. L. SniEs & A. SmrH, supra note 7, §§ 972-974.
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II. TESTAMENTARY EXERCISE OF POWER OF APPOINTMENT
If a statute16 or a donor specifically details the manner in which a power
of appointment is to be exercised and the donee follows the directions, the
court does not become embroiled in intent determinations. 17 Most of the
determination of intent to exercise problems arise when the power is pur-
portedly exercised by, but not specifically referred to in, a general devise of
all the donee's property or the residuary clause of the donee's will.,, At
common law, the rule developed that a will which did not refer to a power
of appointment was presumed not to exercise the power. 19 The judiciary
responded to the rule, and legislatures later responded to these judicially-
created solutions.
A. Determination of Intent to Exercise at Common Law
Both early English" and American courts held that a power of appoint-
ment was exercised only through a reference2' to the power or by an instru-
ment which would otherwise be inoperative unless construed as an exercise
of the power.? Similarly, where a donee executed a general residuary clause
or a general devise of all the donee's property without referring to the power,
16. Id. § 972. Some statutes require that powers of appointment must be
exercised with the same formalities necessary for execution of a will, such as a signed
writing and attestation. Id.; see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 346 comment i,
statutory note 1.
17. L. Snms & A. SMrrH, supra note 7, § 972.
18. See French, supra note 3, at 749-51. The general devise of the donee's
property could be all of the donee's property, or all of the donee's real property, or
all of the donee's personal property. See, e.g., Jones v. Tucker, 2 Merivale 533, 35
Eng. Rep. 1044 (1802); Hollister v. Shaw, 46 Conn. 248 (1878); Standley v. Allen,
349 Mo. 1115, 163 S.W.2d 1012 (1942); Seltzer v. Schroeder, 409 S.W.2d 777 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1966).
19. L. Sms & A. SmrrH, supra note 7, § 973.
20. Jones v. Tucker, 2 Merivale 533, 35 Eng. Rep. 1044 (1817); Lowson v.
Lowson, 3 Bro. C.C. 272, 29 Eng. Rep. 532 (1791).
21. There is disagreement over whether the reference to the power must be
express. One line of authority requires an express reference to the power of appoint-
ment. E.g., Rice v. Park, 223 Ala. 317, 135 So. 472 (1931); Beecher v. Newton, 157
Ga. 113, 120 S.E. 779 (1923); Standley v. Allen, 349 Mo. 1115, 163 S.W.2d 1012
(1942); In re Neill's Estate, 222 Pa. 142, 70 A. 942 (1908). Professors Simes and
Smith maintain that "express language referring to the power" of appointment was
never a requirement. The professors cite no authority for this proposition. L. Snvts
& A. SmITH, supra note 7, § 973.
22. E.g., President & Fellows of Harvard College v. Balch, 171 Ill. 275, 49
N.E. 543 (1898); Patterson v. Wilson, 64 Md. 193, 1 A. 68 (1885); Arnold v. Southern
Pine Lumber Co., 58 Tex. Civ. App. 186, 123 S.W. 1162 (1909).
1987]
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the power was not exercised. 23 Early English courts applied a strict standard:
the "evidence of the donee's intent to exercise must be such that any other
attribution of intent is impossible." 24 In Blagge v. Miles,2 Justice Story began
23. E.g., Hollister v. Shaw, 46 Conn. 248 (1878); Wilmington Trust Co. v.
Grier, 19 Del. Ch. 34, 161 A. 921 (1932); Northern Trust Co. v. House, 3 Ill. App.
2d 10, 120 N.E.2d 234 (1954); Crecelius v. Smith, 255 Iowa 1249, 125 N.W.2d 786
(1964); Seltzer v. Schroeder, 409 S.W.2d 777 (Mo. Ct. App. 1966); Faulkner v.
Faulkner, 93 N.H. 451, 44 A.2d 429 (1945); Farnum v. Pennsylvania Co., 87 N.J.
Eq. 109, 99 A. 145, aff'dper curiam, 87 N.J. Eq. 652, 101 A. 1053 (1916); Wachovia
Bank & Trust Co. v. Trust, 267 N.C. 173, 148 S.E.2d 41 (1966); see also RESTATE-
MENT, supra note 6, § 343(1).
24. Andrews v. Emmot, 29 Eng. Rep. 162 (Ch. 1788).
The King's Bench decided its first case on the exercise of a power not mentioned
in a will in Sir Edward Clere's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 279 (K.B. 1599). The court found
that the devise which contained a description of the land subject to the power must
have exercised the power, "otherwise the devise shall be utterly void." Id. at 280.
The rules on admissibility of extrinsic evidence for the interpretation of written doc-
uments relaxed from one of general exclusion (except in cases of equivocation) to
one in which all relevant extrinsic facts were admissible (direct declarations of intent
were only admissible in cases of equivocation). 9 J. WiGcMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS
AT COMMON LAW §§ 2470-2473 (3d ed. 1940). From 1599 to the statutory reforms of
the 1830's, English courts' decisions on powers of appointment demonstrated the
uncertainty the evolving rules of admissibility were causing. French, supra note 3, at
756-58. Early in the eighteenth century, English courts held that a residuary bequest
of personal property did not exercise a power over stock, rejecting extrinsic evidence
to the contrary, Molton v. Hutchinson, 26 Eng. Rep. 351 (M.R. 1739), and that a
general devise of real and personal effects did not exercise a power over land, Ex
parte Caswall, 26 Eng. Rep. 351 (M.A. 1744) (after considering extrinsic evidence).
In Wallop v. Earl of Portsmouth, Rolls, April 25, 1752, reprinted in E. SUGDEN, A
PRACTICAL TREATISE OF POWER 916 (8th ed. 1861) [hereinafter Wallop], the court
used extrinsic evidence to find that a general devise of real estate exercised a power
over land, where the donee owned no land on which the devise could operate. In
Andrews v. Emmot, 29 Eng. Rep. 162 (Ch. 1788), in which the strict standard for
determination of intent to exercise was set forth, (see supra text at note 24) extrinsic
evidence was considered in order to reach a result which did not frustrate the donee's
intent. Andrews, 29 Eng. Rep. at 166. Lord Eldon's first decision as Chancellor on
implied exercise of powers strictly applied the Andrews standard and announced a
new rule: a general description of property preceded by the pronoun "my" could
not operate as a description of property subject to a power. Nannock v. Horton, 32
Eng. Rep. 158 (Ch. 1802). From the holding in Nannock, the rule evolved that, except
in cases of specific bequests, no disposition of personalty would exercise a power,
including the situation where the donee possessed no personalty but the subject of
the power. This rule, which excluded extrinsic evidence of donee's assets, led to
frustration of the donee's intent because proof of intent to exercise was inadmissible.
See, e.g., Hughes v. Turner, 40 Eng. Rep. 254 (Ch. 1835); Jones v. Curry, 36 Eng.
Rep. 300 (M.R. 1818); Jones v. Tucker, 35 Eng. Rep. 1044 (M.R. 1817). Extrinsic
evidence of real property owned by the donee at the will's execution was admissible
and the rule of Wallop, supra, continued to operate to exercise a power where the
donee owned no land on which a gefieral devise could operate. However, where the
donee both owned and held a power over separate pieces of land located in the same
[Vol. 52
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the American movement toward a more flexible approach to ascertaining
intent to exercise.
26
Justice Story recognized that three situations27 had operated as exceptions
to the general rule presuming no intent to exercise without reference to the
power:
Three classes of cases have been held to be sufficient demonstrations of an
intended execution of a power: (1) Where there has been some reference in
the will or other instrument, to the power; (2) or a reference to the property,
which is the subject, only which it is to be executed; 28 (3) or where the
provision in the will or other instrument, executed by the donee of the power,
would otherwise be ineffectual, or a mere nullity;29 in other words, it would
have no operation, except as an execution of the power. 30
county, a general devise of land in that county would not exercise the power. Napier
v. Napier, 57 Eng. Rep. 489 (V.C. 1826). At this point, English courts no longer
attempted to find the probable intent of the donee, but applied strict rules of exclusion
and repeatedly frustrated the donee's intent. This finally prompted legislation. See
infra note 91.
25. Blagge v. Miles, 3 F. Cas. 559 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 1,479).
26. See infra notes 27-81 and accompanying text.
27. The second of Story's categories is often reclassified as a subclass of the
third category. Thus, Professors Simes and Smith maintain there are but two situa-
tions in which a power is exercised without reference to the power. L. SIMs & A.
SMITH, supra note 7, § 973; see, e.g., Lee v. Simpson, 134 U.S. 572 (1890); In re
Stork's Estate, 233 Iowa 413, 9 N.W.2d 273 (1943); Seltzer v. Schroeder, 409 S.W.2d
777 (Mo. Ct. App. 1966).
28. Lee v. Simpson, 134 U.S. 572 (1890); Wilmington Trust Co. v. Grier, 19
Del. Ch. 34, 161 A. 921 (1932); Boyle v. John M. Smyth Co., 248 Ill. App. 57
(1928); In re Stork's Estate, 233 Iowa 413, 9 N.W.2d 273 (1943); Seltzer v. Schroeder,
409 S.W.2d 777 (Mo. Ct. App. 1966); Price v. Ouiga Realty Co., 113 S.C. 556, 101
S.E. 819 (1920); RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 342.
29. Lee v. Simpson, 134 U.S. 572 (1890); Hartford-Connecticut Trust Co. v.
Thayer, 105 Conn. 57, 135 A. 155 (1926); Grant v. Mullen, 15 Del. Ch. 174, 138 A.
613 (1926); Hakalau v. De la Dux, 35 Haw. 59 (1939); Northern Trust Co. v. Cudahy,
339 Ill. App. 603, 91 N.E.2d 607 (1950); Osburn v. Murphy, 135 Ind. App. 291, 193
N.E.2d 669 (1963); In re Stork's Estate, 233 Iowa 413, 9 N.W.2d 273 (1943); Balls
v. Dampman, 69 Md. 390, 16 A. 16 (1888); Andrews v. Brumfield, 32 Miss. 107
(1856); Seltzer v. Schroeder, 409 S.W.2d 777 (Mo. Ct. App. 1966); Paul v. Paul, 99
N.J. Eq. 498, 133 A. 868 (1926); Price v. Ouiga Realty Co., 133 S.C. 556, 101 S.E.
819 (1920).
Professors Simes and Smith give several examples of the third situation in which
a sufficient demonstration of intent to exercise is found. A devises his ranch to B
for life, remainder to whomever B appoints by will. At his death, B's will includes
the provision: "I leave my ranch to C in fee simple." Under Story's third situation,
the power is presumed to be exercised. B's interest in the ranch was a life estate and
as such he had no interest to devise. The clause in B's will devising the ranch to C
is ineffective unless the court treats it as an exercise of B's power of appointment.
See, e.g., Lee v. Simpson, 134 U.S. 572 (1890); Cooper v. Haines, 70 Md. 282, 17
A. 79 (1889); Dapin v. Piednor, 205 Mo. 321, 104 S.W. 63 (1907). Similarly if the
1987]
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After an analysis of authorities, Story articulated the new American standard:
the evidence of the donee's intent "must be apparent and clear, so that the
transaction is not fairly susceptible of any other interpretation. ' 31 With the
recognition that circumstances other than the three classic situations could
be properly considered,3 2 New York adopted the modern trend and said it
was proper to examine extrinsic evidence of the donee's intent. 33 From these
early decisions arose the common law exercise of powers by implication.
3 4
Three lines of authority have been traced from these early decisions.
3 1
Massachusetts developed a rule creating a presumption in favor of the
donee's intention to exercise a general power.36 The rationale for the Mas-
sachusetts Rule is based on the donee's probable understanding of the nature
of the interest a power of appointment creates. 37 The rule rests on the theory
that many donees equate power with property, and the donee intends to pass
along property subject to a power along with his own property.3 8 Denying a
only provision of B's will reads, "I leave all my real property to C," and B possessed
no real property, a court would find an intent to exercise. Unless the will is construed
as an exercise of the power, the will is ineffective. See Hartford-Connecticut Trust
Co. v. Thayer, 105 Conn. 57, 134 A. 155 (1926). But see infra notes 89-127 and
accompanying text.
30. Blagge v. Miles, 3 F. Cas. 599 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 1,479).
31. Id. at 566.
32. Id.
33. White v. Hicks, 33 N.Y. 383 (1865); see also Funk v. Eggleston, 92 Ill.
515 (1879). In Funk, the donee devised all of her property to her daughters without
reference to a power of appointment. The donee had a life estate and a power of
appointment in two-thirds of a parcel of which she owned a one-third interest outright.
In her will, the donee directed that the land be sold. The court decided she must
have intended to exercise the power because the direction to sell one-third of the
parcel while 222 takers in default shared the two-thirds interest made little sense.
Funk, 92 I11. at 521-43.
34. L. SMs & A. SmITH, supra note 7, § 974. Implied execution is also
referred to as the doctrine of capture. Id.; In re De Lusi's Trusts, 3 L.R. Irish 232
(1879); Fiduciary Trust Co. v. Mishou, 321 Mass. 615, 75 N.E.2d 3 (1947).
35. French, supra note 3, at 782.
36. E.g., Amory v. Meredith, 89 Mass. (7 Allen) 397 (1863); Fiske v. Fiske,
173 Mass. 413, 53 N.E. 916 (1899); Harvard Trust Co. v. Frost, 258 Mass. 319, 154
N.E. 863 (1927); New England Trust Co. v. Wood, 326 Mass. 239, 93 N.E.2d 547
(1950); Fiduciary Trust Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 344 Mass. 1, 181 N.E.2d 6 (1962).
Dictum in Stone v. Forbes, 189 Mass. 163, 75 N.E. 141 (1905), suggested that
the presumption in favor of exercise should extend to special powers. The court could
find "no just ground for a distinction" between a general and special power in regard
to exercise of a power. Id. at -, 75 N.E. at 142. Compare Fiduciary Trust Co.
v. First Nat'l Bank, 344 Mass. 1, 181 N.E.2d 6 (1962) with Beals v. State St. Bank
& Trust, 367 Mass. 318, 326 N.E.2d 896 (1975) (presumption applies to general power
later released creating a special power for tax purposes; concurring opinion critical
of Fiduciary Trust).
37. See Willard v. Ware, 92 Mass. (10 Allen) 263 (1865).
38. Fiduciary Trust Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 344 Mass. 1, 181 N.E.2d 6 (1962);
Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Painter, 322 Mass. 362, 77 N.E.2d 409 (1948).
[Vol. 52
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general disposition or residuary clause the effect of exercising a power would
then defeat the donee's intention.3 9 New Hampshire accepted 4 and followed4'
the Massachusetts Rule until its abandonment in 1945,42 as an arbitrary rule
of construction prohibited by New Hampshire law.43 The Massachusetts leg-
islature rejected the rule by statute, 44 because it often frustrated the intent
of a donee who did not intend to exercise the power.45 The presumption of
intent to exercise applied only where there was no evidence of intent, 46 and
as no extrinsic evidence of any intent was allowed, the presumption operated
to frustrate the intent of the donee who had no intention to exercise the
power by will. 47
The second4 and third49 lines of authority survive as modern common-
law approaches to intent to exercise powers of appointment. 0 The conserv-
ative approach draws its standard from Blagge v. Miles." In DiSesa v. Hickey,12
the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut stated the standard: the intent
to exercise must be "so clearly demonstrated by words or acts ... that the
transaction is not fairly susceptible of any other interpretation. ' 53
39. Boston Safe Deposit, 322 Mass. 362, 77 N.E.2d 409.
40. Emery v. Haven, 67 N.H. 503, 35 A. 940 (1894).
41. L. SndEs & A. SmiTH, supra note 7, § 973.
42. Faulkner v. Faulkner, 93 N.H. 451, 44 A.2d 429 (1945).
43. Id. at 454-55, 44 A.2d at 431.
44. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 191, § 1A (West Supp. 1978-1979) provides:
No general residuary clause in a will and no will making general disposition
of all the testator's property shall exercise a power of appointment created
by another instrument which does not specify a specific method of exercise
unless reference is made to powers of appointment or there is some other
indication of intention to exercise the power.
Id.
45. Probate Committee, Report, BOSTON B.J., June 1975, at 28 [hereinafter
Probate Committee].
46. Harvard Trust Co. v. Frost, 258 Mass. 319, 322, 154 N.E. 863, 864 (1927)
("This rule excludes extrinsic evidence tending to show that the testator meant to
make a different disposition of his property from what appears on the face of the
will.").
47. Probate Committee, supra note 45, at 28. A few jurisdictions expressed
interest in, but did not adopt, the Massachusetts Rule. See Bar Harbor Banking &
Trust Co. v. Preachers' Aid Soc'y, 244 A.2d 558 (Me. 1968); Johnston v. Knight,
177 N.C. 122, 23 S.E. 92 (1895). Contra Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Hunt, 267
N.C. 173, 145 S.E.2d 41 (1966).
48. See infra notes 51-62 and accompanying text.
49. See infra notes 63-77 and accompanying text.
50. French, supra note 3 at 786-90; see infra notes 51-81.
51. 3 F. Cas. 559 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 1,479); see supra text accom-
panying notes 25-31.
52. 160 Conn. 250, 278 A.2d 785 (1971).
53. DiSesa, 160 Conn. at __, 278 A.2d at 790 (quoting Morgan Guar. Trust
Co. v Huntington, 149 Conn. 331, 344-45, 179 A.2d 604, 612 (1962)).
1987]
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In DiSesa, the testator created an inter vivos trust reserving both inter
vivos and general testamentary powers of appointment.5 4 At his death, his
will did not mention the power. The court held that the power was unex-
ercised despite evidence from which intent could have been inferred.5 Ac-
cording to the terms of the will, half the residue of the estate went to testator's
wife, $50,000 was designated for legacies, and the remainder was to pass to
his niece . 6 At the testator's death, the trust assets were approximately $660,000
and his probate estate amounted to approximately $26,000.57 When the tes-
tator executed his will, the trust assets were approximately $740,000 and the
property which would have been included in his probate estate amounted to
approximately $29,000.8 Neither at the time of execution nor at the testator's
death did his personal estate cover even the amount of the legacies. The
court ignored the testator's clearly articulated intent to benefit his wife,
nieces, and nephews,59 and said that because both the testator and the scrivner
were experienced lawyers, it was "fairly susceptible" of the interpretation
that there was no intent to exercise. 60 The testator's wife of ten years took
the entire trust as his sole intestate taker and the niece received nothing. 6'
The DiSesa court's strict application of the general rule against a presumption
of intent to exercise 62 clearly frustrated the testator's intent.
The liberal approach to intent to exercise is followed in Illinois63 and
New Jersey.64 Illinois courts have consistently held that "the intention of the
54. 160 Conn. at 253, 278 A.2d at 787.
55. Id. at 259-60, 278 A.2d at 791.
56. Id. at 254, 278 A.2d at 788. After providing a fee for the executor and
giving jewelry and a car to the testator's wife, the will provided:
All of the remainder of my estate, both real and personal ... to be dis-
tributed... as follows: (a) one-half to Mrs. Hickey; (b) $5,000 to a nephew,
Harold Hickey; (c) $10,000 to a nephew, Marvin N. Hickey; (d) $10,000 to
a niece, Joan; and (e) $25,000 to establish a scholarship fund .... All the
rest and residue of my estate, of every kind and description not otherwise
disposed of herein, I give, devise and bequeath to my niece, Marian Harrell




59. See supra note 56.
60. DiSesa, 160 Conn. at 260, 278 A.2d at 791 ("Both Hickey and DiSesa
were lawyers and we are loath to assume that they did not know or failed to ascertain
the long and well-established Connecticut law concerning the testamentary exercise
of powers of appointment.").
61. Id. at 261, 278 A.2d at 790-91.
62. See supra text accompanying notes 22-23.
63. See Rettig v. Zander, 364 Ill. 112, 4 N.E.2d 30 (1936); Illinois State Trust
Co. v. Southern Ill. Nat'l Bank, 29 Ill. App. 3d. 1, 329 N.E.2d 805 (1975); Northern
Trust Co. v. Moscatelli, 34 Ill. App. 2d 316, 203 N.E.2d 447 (1964); Northern Trust
Co. v. Cudahy, 339 I1l. App. 603, 91 N.E.2d 607 (1950).
64. Bank of New York v. Black, 26 N.J. 276, 139 A.2d 393 (1958). In Black,
the New Jersey Supreme Court rejected the standard of Blagge v. Miles, 3 F. Cas.
[Vol. 52
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testator supercedes the formal requirement with respect to the exercise of a
power of appointment, and that extrinsic evidence may be introduced to
show that intention .... The primary object . .. is therefore to discover
the testator's intention. ' 65 In Illinois State Trust Company v. Southern Il-
linois National Bank,66 the donee held a testamentary power of appointment
over the principal and undistributed income of a trust established by her
husband, of which the donee was a life income beneficiary. The trust pro-
vided that in event of default67 the balance after expenses should be distrib-
uted to the St. Louis Shriner's Hospital for Crippled Children. 68 The donee's
will provided for specific bequests of $50,500.69 Through the residuary clause,
the donee devised the remainder of her estate in one-third shares to a nephew
and a former son-in-law and his present wife. 7 0 There was no reference to
either the trust or the power of appointment in the donee's will.7 1 The trial
court allowed extrinsic evidence through the testimony of several witnesses, 72
including testimony to the effect that the donee had no intention of giving
any trust property tothe Shriners.73
The appellate court upheld the trial court's finding that there was suf-
ficient evidence of an intent to exercise. The court noted the donee was
advised both orally and in writing as to the existence of and her right to
exercise the power. 74 Further, absent the exercise, the donee's personal assets
559 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 1,479) (see supra text accompanying note 31 for a
discussion of the Blagge standard). The court said the object of its investigation was
to determine by a preponderance of the evidence the probable intent of the testator.
Certainty to the point of being unable to form any other interpretation was unnec-
essary, according to the court, and "probabilities should customarily be sufficient."
26 N.J. at 286-87, 139 A.2d at 398.
65. Northern Trust Co. v. Moscatelli, 54 Ill. App. 2d 316, 327, 203 N.E.2d
447, 452 (1950); see also Funk v. Eggleston, 92 Ill. 515 (1879); Rettig v. Zander, 364
Ill. 112, 4 N.E.2d 30 (1936); Northern Trust Co. v. Cudahy, 339 I. App. 603, 91
N.E.2d 607 (1950).
66. 29 Ill. App. 3d 1, 329 N.E:2d 805 (1975).
67. The donor provided for both total and partial default. The trustee was
instructed to deal with any part of the trust assets "insofar as such appointment shall
not extend to or take effect." Id. at 3, 329 N.E.2d at 807.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 5, 329 N.E.2d at 808.
70. Id. The donee's son-in-law married an employee of the donee's husband
approximately ten years after the death of the donee's daughter. Id. at 5, 329 N.E.2d
809.
71. Id. at 4, 329 N.E.2d at 808.
72. The trial court heard testimony from the bank-trustee, the former son-in-
law's wife, the wife's aunt, the nephew's mother, the trust officer, and an attorney
employed by the drafter of the donee's will (the drafter had been "unable to com-
municate for several years"). The court also received into evidence ledger sheets of
the donee's checking and savings accounts. Id. at 6-10, 329 N.E.2d at 809-13.
73. Id. at 7-10, 329 N.E.2d at 810-12.
74. Id. at 11, 329 N.E.2d at 813.
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were insufficient to cover even the specific bequests of $50,500.71 While the
court noted that the residual legatees were the objects of the donee's inter
vivos bounty, 76 the most significant point was the testimony establishing the
donee's disapproval of her husband's bequest to the Shriners and her alleged
statements that she had no intention of allowing the Shriners to receive any
of the trust property.77
The common law position that the residuary clause alone does not ex-
ercise a power of appointment is followed in the twenty-one states which
have no statutory provisions on general dispositions or residuary clauses
exercising powers.78 While American courts were quick to recognize that
circumstances surrounding the transaction should be examined for evidence
of the donee's intent,79 the principal0 split in authority occurred over the
standard to be applied. 8'
75. Id. At the time the will was drafted, the donee had approximately $29,000
in personal assets. Id. at 10, 329 N.E.2d 812-13.
76. The donee gave her former son-in-law and his wife $24,000 to purchase
homes which she shared with them, $30,000 in cash from the trust, and $17,000 in
bonds and savings. Id. at 6, 329 N.E.2d at 809. The donee gave her nephew an
overcoat and "money all the time." In addition, she gave her nephew and his mother
a television, an air conditioner, and a gun. Id. at 9, 329 N.E.2d at 811.
77. Id. at 11, 329 N.E.2d at 813.
78. Mastin v. Merchants Nat'l Bank, 278 Ala. 261, 177 So. 2d 817 (1965);
Welch v. Tarver, 256 Ark. 272, 507 S.W.2d 505 (1974); DiSesa v. Hickey, 160 Conn.
260, 278 A.2d 785 (1971); Carlisle v. Delaware Trust Co., 34 Del. Ch. 133, 99 A.2d
764 (1953); May v. Citizens & S. Bank, 223 Ga. 614, 157 S.E.2d 279 (1967); Illinois
State Trust Co. v. Southern Ill. Nat'l Bank, 29 Ill. App. 3d 1, 329 N.E.2d 805 (1975);
Crawfordsville Trust Co. v. Elston Bank & Trust Co., 216 Ind. 596, 25 N.E.2d 626(1940); Crecelius v. Smith, 255 Iowa 1249, 125 N.W.2d 786 (1964); Sinke v. Muncie,
110 Kan. 345, 203 P. 1102 (1922); Bar Harbor Banking & Trust Co. v. Preacher's
Aid Soc'y of the Methodist Church, 244 A.2d 558 (Me. 1968); Seltzer v. Schroeder,
409 S.W.2d 777 (Mo. Ct. App. 1966); Faulkner v. Faulkner, 93 N.H. 451, 44 A.2d
429 (1945); Pennsylvania Co. for Ins. on Lives & Granting Annuities v. Morrell, 108
N.J. Eq. 188, 154 A. 416 (1931); Trust Co. of Morris County v. Nichols, 62 N.J.
Super. 495, 163 A.2d 205 (1960); Cathey v. Cathey, 28 Tenn. (9 Hum.) 470 (1848);
King v. Richardson, 7 Tenn. App. 535 (1928); Republic Nat'l Bank v. Fredericks,
155 Tex. 79, 283 S.W.2d 39 (1955).
There is law in Ohio to indicate that a residuary clause does not exercise a power
of appointment. See, e.g., Lepley v. Smith, 13 Ohio C.C. 189 (1896); Herron v.
Jones, 55 Ohio App. 274, 9 N.E.2d 703 (1936); In Re Trust of Howald, 65 Ohio
App. 191, 29 N.E.2d 575 (1940); Dollar Sav. & Trust Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 32
Ohio Misc. 81, 285 N.E.2d 768 (C.P. 1972).
79. See 4 W. BowE & D. PARKER, PAGE ON WILLs § 32.9 (rev. ed. 1961); see
also supra text accompanying notes 21-36.
80. Professor French notes there is also disagreement over the admissibility
of extrinsic evidence of direct declarations of the testator's intent. French, supra note
3, at 752-53, 789. The majority rule is that such declarations are not admissible unless
there is an equivocation; direct declarations of intent are then admissible to resolve
the ambiguity. RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 242 comment j. The minority position
[Vol. 52
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B. Statutory Determination of Intent to Exercise
One of the most common estate planning devices used by married couples
is the marital deduction trust.8 2 The marital deduction,83 enacted in 1948,84
postpones federal estate taxation of the first-to-die spouse's property until
the death of the survivor.85 A marital deduction trust gives the surviving
spouse a life estate in the decedent's property and a general testamentary
power of appointment over the remainder.8 6 Through this type of trust, a
testator may control the ultimate disposition of his estate and still take ad-
vantage of the marital deduction. The testator may bequeath his spouse a
life estate with a power of appointment with the understanding that the power
not be exercised, and the property would pass to the testator's designated
taker or takers in default. This plan qualifies for the marital deduction under
the marital deduction trust.17 However, a presumption in favor of exercise
would frustrate an estate plan utilizing the tacit understanding that the prop-
erty go to the testator's designated takers in default. 8
Legislators have acted 9 to prevent adoption of presumptions in favor
of exercise by enacting statutes reinforcing the common law positions0 or
is that direct declarations are admissible wherever relevant to the interpretation of
wills regardless of the presence or absence of an equivocation. See, e.g., Smith v.
Nelson, 249 Ala. 51, 29 So. 2d 335 (1947); Northern Trust Co. v. Cudahy, 339 111.
App. 603, 91 N.E.2d 607 (1950); Wilson v. Flowers, 58 N.J. 250, 277 A.2d 199
(1971).
81. See supra text accompanying notes 53, 65; see also supra note 64.
82. Russoff, Powers of Appointment and Estate Planning, 10 J. F.m. L. 443,
457 (1971).
83. The marital deduction of Internal Revenue Code section 2056(a) provides
for an unlimited deduction of the value of property which passes or has passed from
the decedent to the surviving spouse. Section 2056(b)(l)-(9) limits the deduction in
certain situations. I.R.C. § 2056(a)-(b) (1984).
84. Revenue Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-471, 62 Stat. 1214.
85. I.R.C. § 2056 (1984).
86. Id. § 2056(b)(5). A qualifying life estate under section 2056(b)(5) is one
in which the "surviving spouse is entitled for life to all income from the entire interest,
or all the income from a specific portion thereof, payable annually or at more frequent
intervals, with power in the surviving spouse to appoint ... ." Id.
87. Id. Section 2056(b)(5) provides that such an interest is treated as passing
to the surviving spouse alone. Id.
88. For instance, A bequeaths his entire estate to his wife B for life with a
general testamentary power of appointment, and names their children C and D as
takers in default. A and B have previously agreed that the property should go to C
and D. At B's death, her will's residuary clause operates to leave the remainder of
her estate to her sister E. If a common law or statutory presumption in favor of
exercise exists, a court could find that B intended to exercise the power, and both A
and B's intentions are clearly frustrated.
89. The primary source of pressure for statutory reform appears to be the
marital deduction trust. UsNrom PROBATE CODE § 2-610 comment (1982).
90. See infra notes 96-99.
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limiting early reform statutes. 91 Of the twenty states9 which have adopted
91. Dissatisfaction with the common law resolutions of intent to exercise sit-
uations led to enactment of reform statutes in both the United States and England.
The 1830 New York statute provided that "[lands embraced in a power to devise,
shall pass by a will purporting to convey all the real property of the testator, unless
the intent that the will shall not operate as an execution of the power, shall appear,
expressly or by necessary implication." I N.Y. REv. STATS. pt. II, ch. 1, tit. 2, § 126
(1836) (effective date Jan. 1, 1830). The statute applied to real property subject to
any power, but was not applied where an intention not to exercise appeared in a will.
Lockwood v. Mildeburger, 159 N.Y. 181, 53 N.E. 803 (1899). The statute was ex-
tended to personal property by analogy in the decision of Hutton v. Benkard, 92
N.Y. 294 (1883).
The 1830 English statute provided:
[A] general Devise of the Real Estate of the Testator ... shall be construed
to include any Real Estate ... which he may have Power to appoint in any
Manner he may think proper, and shall operate as an Execution of such
Power, unless a contrary Intention shall appear by the Will; and in like
Manner a Bequest of the Personal Estate of the Testator ... described in
a general Manner, shall be construed to include any Personal Estate...
which he may have Power to appoint in any Manner he may think proper,
and shall operate as an Execution of such Power, unless a contrary Intention
shall appear by the Will.
7 Will. 4 to 1 Vict., ch. 26, § 27. The statute applied only to general powers, but
covered both real and personal property.
Both the New York and English statutes treated property subject to a power as
if it were the donee's property as to whether the property passed by the residuary or
general clause. It has been noted that this suggests both statutes were enacted to
thwart many courts' insistence on distinguishing between power and property. See
French, supra note 3, at 770. Neither the New York nor the English statute distin-
guished between assets the donee actually owned and assets over which the donee
held a power. Unfortunately, the statutes did not abolish the rule against extrinsic
evidence, and courts interpreted the statutes as prohibiting any extrinsic evidence even
in cases where the extrinsic evidence clearly demonstrated contrary intentions. In Re
Deane's Will, 4 N.Y.2d 326, 151 N.E.2d 184, 175 N.Y.S.2d 21 (1958); In re Estate
of Beckwith, 57 App. Div. 2d 415, 395 N.Y.S.2d 499 (1977), modifying, 87 Misc.
2d 649, 366 N.Y.S.2d 615 (1976); In re Estate of Carter, 47 Cal. 2d 200, 302 P.2d
301 (1956); California Trust Co. v. Ott, 59 Cal. App. 2d 715, 140 P.2d 79 (1943).
North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Virginia and West
Virginia enacted statutes based on the English statute. The statutes are still in effect
in these states. N.C. GEN., STAT. ANN. § 31-43 (1976); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 2514(14) (Purdon 1975); R.I. GEN. LAws § 33-6-17 (1969); S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-7-430
(1976); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-67 (1973); W. VA. CODE § 41-3-6 (1966). Maryland's 1888
statute was also based on the English statute. MD. ANN. CODE art. 93, § 359 (1957)
(repealed MD. EST. & TRUSTs CODE ANN. § 4-407 (1976)); see also D.C. CODE ENCYCL.
§ 180-303 (West 1967). California, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, North
Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Utah and Wisconsin had statutes based on the
New York statute. RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 343 comment d.
92. Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Mary-
land, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Missouri (limited to instruments
creating or amending a trust), Nebraska, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota,
Oregon, Utah, and Wisconsin. See infra notes 96-97 for citations.
12
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 52, Iss. 1 [1987], Art. 10
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol52/iss1/10
POWERS OF APPOINTMENT
statutes determining whether a general disposition or residuary clause in a
will exercises a power of appointment, all but New York and California9 3
follow the common law rule. The majority of states have statutes based on
the Uniform Probate Code, 94 while a small group enacted statutes designed
to meet a variety of needs.9 5
Twelve states have adopted the Uniform Probate Code (UPC),96 and
two states have enacted the UPC model provision on exercise of powers of
appointment.Y The UPC codifies the United States common law position as
to the exercise of powers of appointment: the residuary clause alone does
not exercise a power.98 Section 2-610 of the UPC states that
[a] general residuary clause in a will, or a will making general disposition
of all of the testator's property, does not exercise a power of appointment
held by the testator unless specific reference is made to the power or there
is some other indication of intention to include the property subject to the
power.Y
The comment to section 2-610 does not suggest whether the liberal standard
of Illinois and New Jersey'0 or the conservative standard of Blagge v. Miles'0
should be followed as to the admission of extrinsic evidence. It has been
noted that statutes predicated on the UPC model will prevent inadvertent
exercise of a power, but that the statutes will not provide consistency in the
admission of evidence without specification of the standard to be applied. 102
Three states have adopted statutes specifically designed to reverse statutes
based on 1830s models. 03 The Maryland statute was enacted to reverse a
93. See infra notes 117-27 and accompanying text.
94. See infra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
95. See infra notes 103-27 and accompanying text.
96. 8 U.L.A. 83 (Supp. 1979). See ALASKA STAT. § 13.11.265 (1972); AmxZ.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 14-2610 (1975); COLO. REv. STAT. § 15-2-303, 11-610 (1973); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 732.607 (West 1976); 1976 Haw. Sess. Laws, act. 200, § 2-610; IDAHO
CODE § 15-2-610 (1979); MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 524.2-610 (West 1978); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 91A-2-610 (1975); NEB. REv. STAT. § 30-2348 (1975); N.M. STAT. ANN. §
32A-2-610 (1976); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-09-10 (1976); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-
610 (1977).
97. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch 191, § IA (West Cum. Supp. 1978-79); OR.
REv. STAT. § 112.410 (1975).
98. See supra notes 23-78 and accompanying text.
99. 8 U.L.A. 361 (1972).
100. See supra notes 63-77 and accompanying text.
101. Id.
102. French, supra note 3, at 793.
103. Minnesota, Montana, North Dakota and Utah reversed statutes based on
the 1830 New York statute when those states enacted the UPC, see supra note 96
and accompanying text. Massachusetts' UPC based statute reversed a judicial rule
based on the 1830 English statute. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
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statute based on the 1830 English model.' 4 The statute provides:
Subject to the terms of the instrument creating the power, a residuary clause
in a will exercises a power of appointment held by the testator only if: (1)
An intent to exercise the power is expressly indicated in the will; or (2) The
instrument creating the power of appointment fails to provide for disposition
of the subject matter of the power upon its nonexercise.105
Leidy Chemicals Foundation, Inc. v. First National Bank'06 was decided
under the new Maryland statute. The court said the statute reinstated the
law as it existed prior to 1888 and prevents the court from considering
extrinsic evidence as to the donee's intent to exercise.107 Even though the
extrinsic evidence clearly indicated that the donee intended to exercise the
power, the court held that there was no exercise under the statute.108
Michigan and Wisconsin had statutes based on the 1830 New York State
statute.109 The statutes are substantively identical. The Michigan statute states
that
[u]nless otherwise provided in the creating instrument, an instrument man-
ifests an intent to exercise the power if the instrument purports to transfer
an interest in the appointive property which the donee would have no power
to transfer except by virtue of the power, even though the power is not
recited or referred to in the instrument or if the instrument either expressly
or by necessary implication from its wording interpreted in the light of the
circumstances surrounding its drafting and execution, manifests an intent to
exercise the power .... [I]f there is a general power exercisable by will with
no express gift in default in the creating instrument, a residuary clause or
other general language in the donee's will purporting to dispose of all the
donee's estate or property operates to exercise the power but in all other
cases such a clause or language does not in itself manifest an intent to exercise
... power exercisable by will .... 1o
In Hund v. Holmes,"' the Michigan Supreme Court held that the statute
prohibited extrinsic evidence to demonstrate that the donee intended to ex-
104. MD. ANN. CODE art. 93, § 359 (1957) (originally enacted in 1888) (repealed
MD. EsT. & TRUsTs CODE ANN. § 4-407 (1974)), stated that:
[e]very devise and bequest purporting to be of all real and personal property
belonging to the testator shall be construed to include also all property over
which he has a general power of appointment, unless the contrary intention
shall appear in the will or codicil containing such devise or bequest.
Id.
105. MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 4-407 (1974).
106. 276 Md. 689, 351 A.2d 129 (1976).
107. Id. at 693, 351 A.2d at 131.
108. Id.
109. 5 Ajm~icAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 23.40, at 563-64 n.15; see supra note
91 for the text of I N.Y Rnv. STATS. pt. II, ch. 1, tit. 2, § 126 (1836) (effective date
Jan. 1, 1830).
110. MicH. CoiP. LAWS ANN. § .556-114 (Supp. 1979-1980).
111. 395 Mich. 188, 235 N.W.2d 331 (1975).
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ercise a power in the residuary clause of his will. 112 The court stated that if
allowed, the appellee's attempted use of the extrinsic evidence would render
the statute meaningless.
1 3
Wisconsin does not have case law interpreting the 1978 statute.1 4 Pro-
fessor French suggests that if Wisconsin follows the Michigan interpretation
of Hund, all three states will have the English common law of 1830;' 5 that
is, courts will be forced to hold a donee did not exercise a power in the face
of clear evidence the donee intended to do so."
6
The New York and California legislatures enacted statutes which are
substantively re-enactments of the prior statutes despite contrary recommen-
dations."17 The New York statute provides a power is exercised when the
donee "[1]eaves a will disposing of all his property of the kind covered by
the power, unless the intention that the will is not to operate as an execution
of the power appears expressly or by necessary implication."" 8 The statute
is identical to the 1830 statute"19 in that it applies to either a general or special
power. Further, the power will be exercised unless a contrary intention ap-
112. Id. at 197, 235 N.W.2d at 335.
113. Id. at 198, 235 N.W.2d at 335.
114. Wis. STAT. AN. § 702-03(2) (West 1978) provides:
(1) If the donor has explicitly directed that no instrument shall be effective
to exercise the power unless the instrument contains a reference to the specific
power, in order to exercise effectively such a power the donee's instrument
must contain a specific reference to the power or the creating instrument
and expressly manifest an intent to exercise the power or transfer the prop-
erty covered by the power.
(2) In the case of other powers, an instrument manifests an intent to exercise
the power if the instrument purports to transfer an interest in the appointive
property which the donee would have no power to transfer except by virtue
of the power, even though the power is not recited or referred to in the
instrument, or if the instrument either expressly or by necessary implication
from its wording interpreted in light of the circumstances surrounding its
drafting and execution manifests an intent to exercise the power. If there is
a general power exercisable by will with no gift in default in the creating
instrument, a residuary clause or other general language in the donee's will
purporting to dispose of all of the donee's estate or property operates to
exercise the power in favor of the donee's estate, but in all other cases such
a clause or language does not in itself manifest an intent to exercise a power
exercisable by will.
Id.
115. See supra note 24.
116. French, supra note 3, at 796-97.
117. Professor Richard Powell, the major drafter of both the New York and
California statutes, was opposed to the 1830's statutes because they created a pitfall
for the unwary. Powell, Powers of Appointment in California, 19 HAsTn, as L.J.
1281, 1291 (1968).
118. N.Y. EsT. PowERs & TRUsTs LAW § 10-6.1 (McKinney Supp. 1978-79).
119. See supra note 91 for the text of the 1830 statute.
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pears expressly or by necessary implication, as in the prior statute.12 0
The California statute, unlike the New York counterpart, changes the
prior law.' 2' The present statute provides:
A general power of appointment exercisable at the death of the donee is
exercised by a residuary clause or other general language in the donee's will
purporting to dispose of the property of the kind covered by the power
unless the creating instrument otherwise required or the donee manifested
an intent not to exercise the power."2
The statute applies only to general powers, whereas the prior statute applied
to both general and special powers.Iu Although the language concerning
extrinsic evidence of intent to exercise is similar to the New York statute,
24
the Comment of the California Law Revision Commission states that the
new statute was designed to change existing case law'25 which held that ex-
trinsic evidence of the donee's intent not to exercise was inadmissable.'
26
Thus, California courts should hold that the statute allows consideration of
extrinsic evidence of the donee's intent. 2 7
III. MissoUIu's STATUTE PROHIBITING BLIND EXERCISE OF A POWER OF
APPOINTMENT.
Missouri's new statute on the exercise of powers of appointment pro-
vides:
A general residuary clause in a will, or a will making general disposition of
all of the testator's property, does not exercise a power of appointment
granted in an instrument creating or amending a trust unless specific ref-
erence is made to the power or there is some other indication of intention
to include the property subject to the power.'12
120. Id.
121. CAL. PROD. CODE § 125 (West 1956) provided:
A devise or bequest of all the testator's real or personal property, in express
terms, or in any other terms denoting his intent to dispose of all his real or
personal property, passes all the real or personal property which he was
entitled to dispose of by will at the time of his death, including property
embraced in a power to devise.
Id.
122. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1386.2 (West Cum. Supp. 1978).
123. In United Cal. Bank v. Bottler, 16 Cal. App. 3d 610, 94 Cal. Rptr. 227
(1971), the court held that CAL. PROB. CODE §125 (West 1956), applied to both special
as well as general powers.
124. See supra text accompanying note 118 for the text of the New York statute.
125. In re Estate of Carter, 47 Cal. 2d 200, 302 P.2d 301 (1956).
126. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1386-2 comment (West. Supp. 1979).
127. See French, supra note 3, at 800.
128. Mo. REv. STAT. § 456.235 (Supp. 1986) (emphasis added).
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The language is identical to the UPC model provision 129 except for the mod-
ifying phrase limiting its application to powers granted in an instrument
creating or amending a trust.
Prior to the statute, Missouri's law as to the exercise of powers by a
general disposition or residuary clause followed the common law rule. 30 In
Standley v. Allen,13 1 the Missouri Supreme Court held that a clause pur-
porting to dispose of the balance of donee's estate was not intended to
exercise a power of appointment.' 32 In Cross v. Cross,3 the court of appeals
found the donee's language sufficient to exercise a power, although the donee
failed to comply with the donor's requirement that the donee specifically
refer to the donor's will and intent, and that the power of appointment was
created in the donor's Will.134 Thus, the following language is sufficient to
create a power: 35 "[A]ll the rest, residue and remainder . . . including all
property over which I have power of appointment, which power I hereby
exercise in favor of my residuary estate."'
36
Seltzer v. Schroeder137 involved a donee's residuary clause disposing of
her share of a trust.' 38 The trust agreement stated that the share of a deceased
beneficiary was to be distributed to such persons as the beneficiary would
appoint by will. 39 The donee's will included a residuary clause which pro-
vided:
I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder of my
estate to Frederick Schroeder and Cecile Schroeder .... Such residue and
remainder of my estate shall include, although is not limited to, any property
that may be coming to me or my heirs, or such persons as may be named
in my will, from Anna K. Craig ... or her estate, or under the terms of
her will, and which may not have been paid to or received by me at the
time of my death. It is my desire that whatever real or personal property
would go to me or my estate or my legatees through or under the will of
Anna K. Craig... go to Frederick Schroeder and Cecile Schreoder .... 40
Anna Neimer was party to a suit over the contested will of Anna K. Craig.
As part of the settlement, the personal property after expenses and real
property of Anna K. Craig was conveyed in trust to the trustee, Seltzer.
129. See supra text accompanying note 99.
130. See supra note 78.
131. 349 Mo. 1115, 163 S.W.2d 1012 (1942).
132. Id. at 1121, 163 S.W.2d at 1014.
133. 559 S.W.2d 196 (1977).
134. Id. at 209.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 199.
137. 409 S.W.2d 777 (1966).
138. Id. at 781.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 781-82.
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During the three-year life of the trust, the trustee was to distribute income
and after its expiration, the principal.' 41 The trust was subsequently amended,
extending the life of the trust and providing for distribution of a deceased
beneficiary's appointee. 42
The court looked to the three criteria of Justice Story: 43 an execution
of power by will is recognized as intended when the will refers to the power
itself, makes reference to the subject of the power, or where the will cannot
operate except as an execution of the power.'" The stumbling block in de-
termining intent was the fact Anna Neimer had nothing coming to her from
Anna Craig, her estate, or her will. The residuary devisee of Anna Craig
conveyed the property to the trustee to establish a trust, for himself, Anna
Neimer, and two other beneficiaries. "41 The court felt that this, coupled with
the language of Anna Neimer's residuary clause, 14 created a latent ambiguity
in the will. 147 In order to interpret the true intent of Anna Neimer, the court
consulted extrinsic evidence. "Where the ambiguity is latent, it is created by
evidence of extrinsic facts, and the same evidence is admissible to remove
it."'' t4 The court correctly recognized the first sentence of Anna Neimer's 149
residuary clause was not sufficient to exercise the power. 50 But the court
refused to accept appellant's argument that Anna Neimer "meant nothing"
by the 'property that may be coming to me' from 'Anna K. Craig ... or
her estate."' Instead, the court found that the testator could reasonably
regard her interest in the trust as coming from Anna Craig, because the trust
was a result of a settlement involving the estate of Anna Craig., The ref-
erence Anna Neimer made to her interest in the trust was sufficient when
considered in the light of the language used to exercise the power and the
extrinsic circumstances. 5 2
While the court did consult extrinsic evidence, under the DiSesa v.
Hickey' standard, the transaction was not fairly susceptible of any other
141. Id. at 781.
142. Id. at 782.
143. See supra notes 28-30.
144. Seltzer, 409 S.W.2d at 782.
145. Id. at 783.
146. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
147. Seltzer, 409 S.W.2d at 783.
148. Id. at 784 (citing McMahan v. Hubbard, 217 Mo. 624, 118 S.W.2d 481
(1909); Willard v. Darrah, 168 Mo. 660, 68 S.W. 1023 (1902)).
149. Seltzer, 409 S.W.2d at 785.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 786.
152. Id. Another of the grounds reinforcing the court's decision was the strong
Missouri presumption that testators intend to dispose of the entire estate and not to
die intestate as to any part of it. If a provision of a will is fairly open to more than
one construction, the construction resulting in partial intestacy will not be adopted
if it can be avoided by any reasonable construction. In determining the construction,
the court must be guided by the circumstances surrounding the will. Id. at 787.
153. 160 Conn. 250, 278 A.2d 785 (1971).
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interpretation.1 4 There was, as the Seltzer court noted, no other possible
interpretation.' 5  The court appears to have adopted the conservative common
law approach to admissibility of extrinsic evidence to determine intent to
exercise.156 This could set the stage for the development of two differing sets
of rules for testatmentary powers of appointment.
The new Missouri statute, section 456.235,1 7 applies only to "a power
of appointment granted on an instrument creating or amending a trust.""'
The statute will not apply to powers of appointment which do not involve
trusts. Since the statute is patterned'59 after the UPC model provision,'16
Missouri courts could be persuaded to follow the recommendation of the
UPC committee if and when the committee suggests a standard as to the
admission of extrinsic evidence.161 If the committee recommends the liberal
standard, Missouri would consequently follow a liberal standard as to the
exercise of powers granted by an instrument creating or amending a trust
and the conservative standard of Seltzer'62 as to powers not involving trusts,
such as powers to convey or sell real estate granted in a deed or a power of
appointment granted in conjunction with a life estate. 63 Similarly, a donee
could appoint another donee of the power created in a trust agreement and
section 456.235'6 would not apply to the second donee's exercise. Thus the
liberal standard would be applied to the first donee's exercise and the con-
servative Seltzer approach to the second donee's exercise.
Presumably the Missouri legislature meant to enact a provision protect-
ing the marital deduction trust. 165 Under section 456.235,166 such a trust would
be protected. However, by modifying the UPC model provision' 67 with the
limiting language, 6 the legislature has laid the framework for conflicting
standards for exercise of powers of appointment.
EVA C. ENSOR
154. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
155. Seltzer, 409 S.W.2d at 785.
156. See supra notes 51-62 for a discussion of the conservative approach.
157. Mo. REv. STAT. § 456.235 (Supp. 1986).
158. See supra note 128 for entire text of Mo. Rv. STAT. § 456.235 (Supp.
1986).
159. See supra notes 128-29.
160. See supra note 99.
161. See supra notes 100-02.
162. See supra notes 153-56.
163. The statute would apply to the marital deduction trust of IRC § 2056(a),
which is a life estate in the surviving spouse with a power of appointment. See supra
notes 82-87 and accompanying text.
164. Mo. REv. STAT. § 456.235 (Supp. 1986).
165. See supra notes 82-87 and accompanying text.
166. Mo. REv. STAT. § 456-235 (Supp. 1986).
167. See supra note 99.
168. See supra note 128 (emphasized language).
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